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Abstract
Background: In 2004, a community-based health insurance scheme (CBI) was introduced in Nouna health district,
Burkina Faso. Since its inception, coverage has remained low and dropout rates high. One important reason for low
coverage and high dropout is that health workers do not support the CBI scheme because they are dissatisfied
with the provider payment mechanism of the CBI.
Methods: A discrete choice experiment (DCE) was used to examine CBI provider payment attributes that influence
health workers’ stated preferences for payment mechanisms. The DCE was conducted among 176 health workers
employed at one of the 34 primary care facilities or the district hospital in Nouna health district. Conditional logit
models with main effects and interactions terms were used for analysis.
Results: Reimbursement of service fees (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 1.49, p<0.001) and CBI contributions for medical
supplies and equipment (aOR 1.47, p<0.001) had the strongest effect on whether the health workers chose a
given provider payment mechanism. The odds of selecting a payment mechanism decreased significantly if the
mechanism included (i) results-based financing (RBF) payments made through the local health management team
(instead of directly to the health workers (aOR 0.86, p<0.001)) or (ii) RBF payments based on CBI coverage
achieved in the health worker’s facility relative to the coverage achieved at other facilities (instead of payments
based on the numbers of individuals or households enrolled at the health worker’s facility (aOR 0.86, p<0.001)).
Conclusions: Provider payment mechanisms can crucially determine CBI performance. Based on the results from
this DCE, revised CBI payment mechanisms were introduced in Nouna health district in January 2011, taking into
consideration health worker preferences on how they are paid.
Keywords: Health insurance, Health workers, Third-party payers, Choice behaviour, Burkina Faso
Background
In early 2004, a community-based health insurance (CBI)
scheme, Assurance Maladie à Base Communautiare
(AMBC), was introduced in Nouna health district, Bur-
kina Faso. CBI is a common term used for voluntary,
not-for-profit health insurance schemes, organized at the
level of the community [1,2]. Under CBI schemes, mem-
bers of a community, often defined by geographical prox-
imity or through employment-based relationships, pool
resources in order to provide support for covering health
expenditures [3]. CBI has been seen as an attractive solu-
tion to the challenge of generating financial resources for
healthcare in developing countries, because CBI is
designed to assist the many people in those countries
who work in rural and informal sectors. Such people
rarely have access to other types of health insurance,
since these usually require employment in the formal
sector [2,4-8]. The development of CBI programs in sub-
Saharan Africa has garnered substantial interest by both
researchers and policymakers alike, as an instrument to
reduce financial barriers to care where other types of
health insurance schemes cannot be implemented
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sustaining CBI schemes are low rates of community
member enrollment and high dropout rates, leading to
low CBI coverage. Low CBI coverage, in turn, results in
low levels of revenue and limited risk-pooling, which can
leave CBI schemes financially and organizationally vul-
nerable to unexpected changes in enrollees’ incomes or
disease incidence.
Study setting
This study took place in Nouna health district in north-
west Burkina Faso, is a predominantly rural area where
the majority of the population depends on subsistence
agriculture as their primary livelihood. The city of
Nouna is approximately 300 km from Ouagadougou (the
capital of Burkina Faso) and approximately 100 km from
the border with Mali. The city is both the headquarters
of Nouna health district as well as the administrative
center of the province of Kossi.
The details of the implementation of the Nouna CBI
scheme and its benefit package are described elsewhere
[18-20]. The participation of health workers in the
scheme depends on whether they are employed in the
CBI implementation zone or not. Facilities that operate
within the CBI implementation zone sign two-year con-
tracts with the insurance scheme, in which the mechan-
ism and schedule for provider payments for coverage of
enrollees’ expenses are defined. At the time of the study
(April/May 2010), all 13 primary-care facilities and the
one secondary-care facility (the district hospital) within
the zone, in which the CBI has been implemented,
contracted with the scheme. In addition to these 13 fa-
cilities, 21 primary-care facilities operated within Nouna
health district but were outside of the CBI scheme’s im-
plementation zone.
Description of the existing provider payment mechanisms
of the Nouna CBI
At the time of the study, the CBI scheme in Nouna used a
third-party payment mechanism to finance care provided
to the scheme’s enrollees (see Figures 1 and 2). Within this
payment mechanism, primary- and secondary-care facil-
ities, which had contracted with the scheme, were paid by
the CBI on an annual capitation basis, i.e., the facilities
received a flat payment per individual enrolled in the CBI
[4,21]. These payments were only intended to cover the
cost of drugs prescribed to enrollees by health facility
personnel. Premiums paid by households were collected
during the annual enrollment campaign (January-June
each year). If individuals were enrolling for the first time,
they were obligated to adhere to a three-month waiting
period before receiving their CBI ID card, which granted
them access to services and drugs included in the
scheme’s benefit package [18,22]. If individuals enrolled
during the previous year, their ID card was automatically
updated and no waiting period was enforced.
Once the campaign closed at the end of June, the CBI
Management Unit calculated the level of capitation pay-
ments that would be made to primary care facilities and
the district hospital. Health facility payments were based
on the number of individuals who enrolled in the catch-
ment areas of each primary care facility. Once the total
premium revenue for each facility was calculated, 10% of
funds were set aside for operational costs of the scheme.
Of the remaining 90%, 75% was allocated to the asso-
ciated primary care facility and 25% to the district
hospital.
Figure 1 Description of the Nouna CBI financing and payment model, 2004–2010.
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facility and the district hospital, and were used to track
drugs prescribed to CBI enrollees over the length of the
calendar year. The pharmacy manager of each facility
was given the task to update registers as enrolled patients
were provided drugs. At the end of each calendar year,
the total costs incurred through enrollee prescriptions
were calculated. If the annual total exceeded the sum
allocated through the initial capitation payments, the fi-
nancial deficit was reimbursed by an external fourth
party (since 2005, a philanthropic German foundation)
during the first quarter of the following year. Service fees,
such as consultation and medical service fees, were not
included in this reimbursement, nor were they paid by
enrolled patients. Further details of the CBI payment
mechanism at the time of the study are shown in Table 1.
The financing and payment mechanisms used by the
Nouna CBI scheme were somewhat of a radical departure
from those found within the traditional approach to finan-
cing public sector health facilities in Burkina Faso. In the
traditional financing mechanism, health facilities acquired
funds through two general sources: (i) budget allocations
from the Ministry of Health, and (ii) revenue generated
from service fees and drug sales. The second source of rev-
enue was used for minor facility investments, the restock-
ing of drugs and supplies, and health worker bonuses. A
significant proportion of service fee revenue (20-22%) was
reserved for the bonuses (known as ristournes), which were
paid on a quarterly basis. Within these traditional financing
and payment mechanisms, individual health workers had
two primary sources of income: (i) a monthly salary, and
(ii) the abovementioned quarterly bonus, which had the
Figure 2 Description of the Nouna CBI's health facility payment schedule, 2004–2010.
Table 1 CBI payment mechanisms, 2004-2010
Payment attribute Explanation
Capitation payment level The enrollment premium was 500 FCFA ($1 USD) for children under 15 years of age and 1500 FCFA
($3 USD) for adults 15 years of age and older. 10% of the total of capitation payments was reserved
for the CBI management, and the remaining 90% was split between primary- (3 quarters) and
secondary-care (1 quarter) facilities. The capitation payment was meant to cover all drug costs
for enrollees during the calendar year.
Capitation payment schedule The capitation was paid once a year, normally in July or August, after the annual enrollment
campaign closed (end of June each year).
Allocation of medical supplies
and equipment
Neither medical supplies (cotton, alcohol, Bétadine, Sparadrap, etc.) nor medical equipment
(tension meter, stethoscope, thermometer, scale, height gauge) were paid for by the CBI scheme.
Reimbursement of consultation
and service fees
None. The capitation paid to facilities was meant to cover only the cost of drugs prescribed to enrollees. Fees for
consultations and services consumed by enrollees were not covered by the annual capitation, nor included in the
calculations to determine the annual deficit reimbursement (see below), and were not paid by CBI enrollees.
Capitation deficit reimbursement If the total cost of drugs prescribed to enrollees exceeded the capitation payment, the resulting
deficit for each calendar year was reimbursed (by an external fourth party) during the first quarter
of the following calendar year.
Results-based financing (RBF)
provider payment mechanism
At the time of the study, there existed no results-based financing provider payment mechanism
(financial or non-financial) linked to CBI coverage.
FCFA: Franc Communauté Financière Africaine, the local currency used in Burkina Faso. 500 FCFA=$1 USD.
CBI: Community-based health insurance.
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workers stationed in facilities with high utilization rates.
Under the Nouna CBI's provider payment mechanism, en-
rolled patients no longer paid service fees, and capitation
payments were only made to cover the cost of drugs pre-
scribed to enrollees. For health facilities where a significant
proportion of patients were CBI enrollees, the fact that ser-
vice fees were not paid by enrollees (nor reimbursed by the
CBI scheme), constituted a significant loss in revenue for
the health facility and the workers employed there [23,24].
Previous unpublished studies on the CBI scheme in
Nouna have found wide-spread health worker dissatis-
faction with the CBI payment mechanism, noting their
particular dissatisfaction with various payment attributes
[23,25]:
  The low overall level of capitation (which in the past
has led to budget deficits that needed to be covered
by an external donor);
  The payment schedule (once per year in July, leading
to facilities pre-financing enrollee medical costs
during the first six months of the budget cycle);
  The fact that capitation is the only payment
mechanism used by the CBI scheme (when
additional payment mechanisms could possibly
improve health worker motivation and the financial
situation of facilities).
Low health worker satisfaction, inappropriate incentive
structures, and fear of facility bankruptcy have led to
health worker resistance to provide friendly, comprehen-
sive, and high-quality care to CBI enrollees [23,25]. In
turn, the perception in the community that CBI enrollees
receive worse-quality care than other patients (e.g., less
friendly reception by health workers and lower quantities
of drugs) is likely to have been a major cause of the low
CBI coverage observed [23,25]. Studies in other settings
have also shown that provider payment mechanisms are
indeed an important factor affecting CBI coverage, be-
cause they crucially determine health-worker satisfaction
and support for a CBI [13,26].
Since the inception of the CBI scheme in Nouna, cover-
age has remained low, despite an upward trend over time
[27,28]. During the first year of operation (2004) coverage
was 5%; by 2010, coverage had merely increased to 9%.
Enrollee drop-out rates have also been high throughout
the existence of the CBI, despite a decline over time (the
annual drop-out was 32% in 2004 and 16% in 2010) [29].
A study in 2006 found that the most common reasons for
dropping out of coverage included several that were linked
to health worker attitudes and behaviors, such as “Id i d n ’t
like medical staff behavior” (19%), “Not satisfied with ser-
vices received” (7%), and “I was not given good drugs”
(6%) [30], suggesting that improved health worker support
of the CBI could reduce enrollee drop-out. Again, based
on previous studies, it seems likely that health worker sup-
port for the CBI could be substantially improved through
changes in payment mechanisms, which in turn would re-
duce drop-out rates [23,25].
Provider payment may not only improve CBI coverage
indirectly through influence on health worker satisfac-
tion and motivation, but also directly. Results-based fi-
nancing (RBF) linked to CBI coverage has the potential
to motivate health workers to increase the number of
people enrolled in CBI. In essence, RBF involves the
“transfer of money or material goods conditional on tak-
ing a measurable action or achieving a predetermined
performance target” [31]. Within the context of the CBI
scheme in Nouna health district, there is substantial cap-
acity for health workers to do more to promote CBI.
According to patient exit interviews in 2010, in only 8%
of healthcare visits of non-enrollees did health workers
mention the possibility to enroll in CBI, and in only 3%
of healthcare visits of enrollees did they remind patients
to re-enroll in the CBI [32]. By introducing an RBF
mechanism that is explicitly linked to changes in CBI
coverage, health workers could be financially motivated
to promote enrollment in the CBI.
In this study, we investigate health worker preferences
for CBI payment mechanisms. We use a discrete choice
experiment (DCE) to examine CBI provider payment attri-
butes that influence health workers’ stated preferences for
an insurance payment mechanism that incorporates not
only payment level, timing and reimbursement options,
but also a results-based financing mechanism linked to
CBI coverage. We test the premise that provider pay-
ment mechanisms currently applied by the CBI scheme
are poorly aligned with health worker preferences for
how they are paid. We hypothesize that the misalign-
ment of incentives has led to poor levels of provider sat-
isfaction, inducing a resistance to support the CBI
scheme’s efforts to improve enrollment levels. By revis-
ing the payment mechanism and aligning provider
incentives with CBI objectives, health worker satisfac-
tion with the scheme may improve, leading to increased
support for the scheme and in turn to an increase in the
number of health workers promoting enrollment. This
study specifically explores payment attributes that are
amenable to change, to assist policy makers in re-
designing the provider payment mechanisms used by a
CBI, with the aim to increase health workers’ motivation
to support and promote CBI.
Methods
Study sample
As the CBI scheme aims to extend its zone of operation
from 13 to all 34 primary-care facilities in Nouna health
district by 2013, our study sample included all 185
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secondary-care facilities in the district. Of these health
workers, 105 (57%) were employed at facilities within
the CBI implementation zone at the time of data
collection.
Theories underlying DCE
Several theories underlie DCEs and the analysis of DCE
results. DCEs are consistent with Lancaster’s theory of
consumer demand [33], in which consumers have
preferences for and derive utility from the underlying
attributes of goods, rather than actual goods per se.
DCEs are also consistent with choice-based consumer
theory in that they explicitly assume that choices
observed reveal the preferences of individuals [34].
Choices made in DCEs are analyzed using random utility
theory [35], which assumes that utility (U) for individual
i conditional on choice j can be decomposed into an
explainable systematic component Vij and a random
component [36]:
Uij ¼ Vij þ Eij;j ¼ 1;...;J
The random component captures unobservable attri-
butes of the goods, unobserved preference variation, sys-
tematic error and random measurement error. The
systematic component is a function of observed attri-
butes of the good or service and observed characteristics
of individuals who make choices, which can be modeled
as followed:
PY 1 ¼ 1 ðÞ ¼ PU i1 > Uij

¼ PV i1 þ Ei1 > Vij þ Eij

¼ PV i1   Vij > Eij   εi1

8j 6¼ 1
where Yi is a random variable denoting the choice out-
come. Estimable choice models are then derived by as-
suming a joint probability distribution for the random
component [36].
DCE design
In order to determine how to divide the CBI payment
mechanisms into coherent attributes that could be easily
understood by respondents, we conducted 6 focus-group
discussions and 16 in-depth interviews with health work-
ers practicing within the CBI zone, as well as 3 in-depth
interviews with members of the CBI Management Unit.
Based on analyses of these qualitative findings [25], we
produced a list of 10 candidate payment attributes, which
was presented to the CBI Management Unit and District
Health Management Team (DHMT) for discussion. In
order to make sure that there was no overlap in attri-
butes, and to ensure that the proposed attributes com-
prehensively described the CBI payment mechanisms,
the list was also presented to local stakeholders during a
half-day workshop. During this workshop, the final list
was narrowed to 6 attributes and then validated by work-
shop participants as being a representative description of
the CBI payment mechanisms. Four attributes on the
final list were related to the provider payment mechan-
isms currently in place and two attributes were related to
a proposed RBF mechanism that would pay health facil-
ities an additional bonus payment based on CBI coverage
results for each health facility. The final DCE attributes
included: (1) the level of capitation paid, (2) the capita-
tion payment schedule, (3) medical supplies and equip-
ment paid for by the CBI scheme, (4) reimbursement of
service fees, (5) the indicator used to determine the size
of the RBF payment, and (6) the recipient of the RBF pay-
ment. Follow-up meetings were held with the CBI Man-
agement Team and DHMT to choose and validate the
levels for the 6 final DCE attributes. For each attribute,
either two or three levels were chosen, with the baseline
level for the first four attributes being the payment
mechanism at the time of the study (Table 2).
Payment levels for the capitation attribute (#1) were
determined based on an ongoing local policy debate on
whether a fourth external party (the same German philan-
thropic organization mentioned above) would subsidize
child premiums with an additional 1000 Franc Commu-
nauté Financière Africaine (FCFA), which equals about $2
USD, in order to be equal to the 1500 FCFA premium
paid by adults. Previous simulations had been run with
various subsidy levels and the additional 1000 FCFA was
estimated to significantly reduce the recurring annual def-
icit. Given that health centers were obligated to use ser-
vice fee and drug sale revenues from uninsured patients
to cover short-term deficits created by enrollee drug con-
sumption levels, annual in-kind drug or medical supply
contributions provided directly by the CBI scheme was
included as a provider payment attribute (#3). It was also
decided that the mechanism for RBF payments would not
replace any existing financing mechanisms, but would act
as a top-up for capitation payments and would be directly
linked to facility-level CBI enrollment outcomes. The RBF
payment levels proposed in attribute #5 were based on
the CBI scheme’s budget limitations but also took into
consideration what would be considered sufficient to mo-
tivate health workers given current enrollment rates.
The six attributes produced a full factorial of 486 pos-
sible alternatives. A blocked design was applied to create
10 questionnaire versions, where versions were generated
by randomly assigning (without replacement) choice sets
from the overall design. Each choice set included two non-
labeled payment mechanism alternatives without an opt-
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mechanism). While health applications generally have used
smaller numbers of choice sets; in other fields of research
32 choice sets or more per respondent have commonly
been employed [36]. Given the relatively small number of
health workers employed in Nouna health district at the
time of the survey (less than 200), and the fact that respon-
dents were not obligated to complete the questionnaire in
one sitting (respondents had 10 days to complete the ques-
tionnaire before submitting to the District Health Office),
we decided to use a comparatively large number of choice
sets. Choice sets were selected using an experimental
design developed in STATA 11 that ensured both bal-
ance (i.e., levels of each attribute appear equally often)
and orthogonality (i.e., all attributes are statistically inde-
pendent of one another) of the attributes. This selection
approach also minimized overlap among attribute levels
(i.e., attribute levels do not repeat themselves within
choice sets) and maximized utility balance (i.e., different
alternatives within choice sets have similar probabilities of
being chosen). These properties are desirable design cri-
teria, allowing for maximum estimation efficiency [36,37].
Each block version was randomly assigned to 20 respon-
dents, as empirical evidence shows that rarely more than 20
respondents per survey version are needed to estimate reli-
able models using discrete choice data [36]. Respondents
were then asked to select their preferred payment mechan-
ism from each of 21 choice sets (20 random and 1 fixed).
The fixed choice set offered two alternative payment
mechanisms, with one intended to be strictly dominant
over the other.
The survey questionnaire included three sections. In the
first section, information was collected on respondents’
demographic and professional characteristics, including
age, sex, ethnicity, current professional title and qualifica-
tions, years worked at current facility and within Nouna
health district, and current employment at a healthcare
facility within the CBI implementation zone versus outside
the zone. The second section presented the 20 rando-
mized choice sets and 1 fixed task. In the third section,
respondents were asked to simply choose their preferred
payment option for each attribute included in the DCE.
The full questionnaire was pre-tested with 10 health
workers and minor revisions were made, including changes
to the terminology used to describe several attribute levels
and the addition of a more detailed description of the
objectives of the study and the history of the Nouna CBI
scheme. During the data collection process, the research
Table 2 DCE insurance payment attributes and levels
Number Payment element Level Payment modality
1 Level of capitation payment
per individual
A 500 FCFA per child (under 15 years of age) and 1500 FCFA per adult (current level)
B 500 FCFA per child (under 15 years of age) and 1500 FCFA per adult. Children will continue to pay 500
FCFA, while a 1000 FCFA subsidy (financed by an external fourth party) will be added for payment to
facilities for each child enrolled
2 Capitation payment
schedule
A Payment one time per year (current schedule)
B Payment twice per year (each April and July)
C Payment four times per year (each quarter)
3 Annual allocation of medical
supplies/equipment by CBI
scheme
A None (current allocation)
B Basic medical supplies (cotton, alcohol, Bétadine, Sparadrap)
C Basic medical supplies (cotton, alcohol, Bétadine, Sparadrap) and medical
equipment (tension meter, stethoscope, thermometer, scale, height gauge)
4 Reimbursement of service
fees
(consultation+medical acts),
financed
by an external fourth party
A None (current reimbursement)
B Reimbursement at 50% the price of service fees paid by non-enrollees
C Reimbursement at 100% the price of service fees paid by non-enrollees
5 Results-based financing
(RBF) – indicator
to determine size of
payment
A By individual enrolled (500 FCFA for new enrollees and 250 FCFA for re-enrollees)
B By household enrolled (2000 FCFA for newly enrolled households and
1000 FCFA for households who renew their membership)
C A monetary award for the three best health facilities, based on the increase
in CBI coverage between the previous and the current year
6 Results-based financing
(RBF) – recipient.
A Individual health agents (distribution of RBF among different team members
will be pre-determined and applied district-wide)
B Global payment for health worker team (method of RBF distribution among
different team members will be decided by the facility team members)
C Local health facility management committee will decide on method of
RBF distribution among health workers and facility needs
FCFA: Franc Communauté Financière Africaine CFA, the local currency used in Burkina Faso. 500 FCFA=$1 USD.
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cialty services at the district hospital. All respondents took
part in a detailed presentation on the CBI scheme and its
payment mechanisms, as well as how to complete the
questionnaire. First, the contextual background for the
study was presented to participants, noting that the CBI
scheme management aimed to reform its provider pay-
ment system in 2011, and would like to better understand
health worker preferences before making any changes. The
current CBI payment mechanism, particularly the break-
down of how capitation payments were derived from pre-
miums, was then described in detail, followed by a
presentation on the payment attributes and corresponding
levels found in the questionnaire. For many participants, it
was their first exposure to RBF, so attention was paid to
explaining carefully and repeatedly the “linking payments
to results” approach of RBF. One practice choice set was
presented to each participant, who completed it in the
presence of an interviewer, who was available to assist if
questions arose. Questionnaires were then independently
completed and submitted to the District Health Office
within 10 days from the research team’sv i s i t .
Statistical analysis
After data entry, plausibility checks and data cleaning,
we estimated sample summary statistics in STATA 11.
As the response data for the selection of alternative pay-
ment mechanisms was a dichotomous outcome (1=being
chosen; 0=not being chosen), dummy coding was used to
transform the L attribute levels into L-1 dummy variables
in which each dummy is set equal to 1 when the qualita-
tive level is present and set equal to 0 if it is not. We esti-
mated main-effects conditional logit models with payment-
mechanism attributes as the sole explanatory variables
using STATA’s clogit command. The model allowed us to
estimate how the choice among alternative mechanisms is
affected by characteristics of the mechanisms that vary
across choice sets. The conditional logit model is an appro-
priate model when data includes both chosen alternatives
and alternative-specific regressors [38], as is the case with
DCE data. In the conditional logit model, the predicted
probability of observing outcome m is:
Py i ¼ m ð jziÞ¼
exp zimγ ðÞ
Σ
j
j¼1 exp zijγ
 form ¼ 1toJ
where zim contains values of the independent variables for
the alternative m for case i.
For the alternative-specific regressors, the odds ratio is
the multiplicative effect of being offered the selected at-
tribute level relative to the baseline level on the odds of
choosing any given payment mechanism alternative [38].
To understand how respondents’ demographic and
professional characteristics influenced their payment
preferences, we also estimated models that included
interaction terms for several variables with payment at-
tribute variables. To test how gender influenced pay-
ment preferences, we included sex (1=male; 0=female)
in Model 2. Given that head nurses had substantially
more involvement in the financial aspects of health facil-
ity management, we included an interaction term for the
respondent’s title at the health facility in Model 3
(1=head nurse; 0=other). To examine if preferences
significantly differed between health workers at primary
care facilities and those working at the district hospital,
we included level of care where the respondent was
employed in Model 4 (1=primary-care facility; 0=sec-
ondary-care facility). Finally, in order to understand how
prior experience with CBI influenced respondents’ pre-
ferences, we included facility location in Model 5
(1=CBI intervention zone; 0=outside CBI intervention
zone). Inclusion of interaction terms in Models 2–5 also
allowed for sensitivity analysis, allowing us to investigate
the robustness of our main findings in comparison to
the main-effects model (Model 1).
We repeated the analysis using a conditional logit model
without the respondents who chose the payment mechan-
ism that was intended to be inferior in the fixed task choice
set, as it is plausible (but not cogent) that these respon-
dents gave invalid answers. Finally, to ensure that the most
appropriate model was used, we repeated the statistical
analysis for the main effects model using a random-effects
logit model (Model 6), a fixed-effects logit model (Model
7), and a random-effects probit model (Model 8).
Ethics
The University of Heidelberg received approval for the re-
search from their human subjects committee in Germany
(130/2002) which was extended in 2005 and 2008, as well as
the Nouna Health Research Center ethical committee
(2005-005/CLE/CRSN). All respondents were informed of
the research objectives and were asked to take part in the
study. Those who agreed were asked to sign a consent form.
Results
Out of 185 healthcare workers in Nouna district, 176 (95%)
participated in the survey. Three respondents refused to
participate, and six were absent during the data collection
period. Demographic and professional characteristics of the
sample are presented in Table 3.
In the fixed task, in which we presented the same choice
set to all respondents, 13 (7%) chose among the two alter-
natives the one that was intended to be inferior (which
offered a lower premium level, a capitation schedule of
one payment per year, no donation of medical supplies
and equipment, and no reimbursement of services fees).
Models estimated with and without these respondents did
not differ substantively and so, consistent with current
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analysis [39].
The preferred payment options of health workers for
the CBI provider payment attributes from Section 3 in the
questionnaire are presented in Table 4. The majority of
health workers preferred a baseline capitation of 1500
FCFA for children (59%), capitation payments made quar-
terly (42%), an annual CBI provision of medical materials
and equipment (77%), 100% reimbursement of service fees
(61%), the number of individuals enrolled as an indicator
to determine the size of the RBF payment (54%), and a
global payment to the facility health worker team as the
payment mechanism for the RBF mechanism (59%).
The odds ratios for selection of payment attributes
estimated from the conditional logit models are shown
in Table 5. In the main-effects model (Model 1), all attri-
bute level alternatives were significantly different from
zero except for household coverage as an evaluation in-
dicator for the RBF mechanism (relative to individual
coverage as an evaluation indicator). The main effects
model had considerable overlap with the respondents'
payment preferences (Table 4), both in preferences for
attribute levels and signs of the odds ratios.
In the main-effects model, 100% reimbursement of ser-
vice fees (adjusted odds ratio (aOR) 1.49, p<0.001) and
donation of medical supplies and equipment (aOR 1.47,
p<0.001) had the largest effect on the probability of a
payment alternative being chosen. Capitation payments
being made twice per year had a larger effect on alterna-
tive selection than payments made four times per year
(aOR 1.18, p<0.001 vs. aOR 1.08, p=0.046). For both the
Table 4 Health worker unrestricted payment preferences
Payment attribute Level Percent (%)
Capitation level A 41
B5 9
Capitation Schedule A 34
B2 4
C4 2
Provision of materials A 11
B1 2
C7 7
Reimbursement of service fees A 5
B3 4
C6 1
Results-based financing – indicator
to determine size of payment
A5 4
B3 0
C1 6
Results-based financing – Recipient A 23
B5 9
C1 8
Table 3 Socio-professional characteristics of respondents
Characteristic Value
No. %
Respondents 176 100
Sex
Male 103 59
Female 73 41
Age
< 30 44 25
30-34 77 44
35-40 36 20
40-44 9 5
45-50 6 3
> 50 4 2
Ethnicity
Mossi 69 39
Bwaba 27 15
Samo 16 9
Dafing 14 8
Gurunsi 11 6
Other 39 22
Current work location
Based at first-line facility (CSPS) 107 62
Based at second-line facility (CMA) 69 39
Facility in current CBI zone 101 57
Facility outside current CBI zone 75 43
Current professional title
Doctor 4 2
Professional nurse with specialization (AS) 10 6
Facility head nurse (ICP) 32 18
Professional nurse with diploma (IDE) 19 11
Professional nurse (IB) 15 9
Professional midwife (SFE/ME) 9 5
Auxiliary midwife (AA) 34 19
General health worker (AIS) 29 16
Lab technician 15 9
Hospital chief accountant 1 1
Rather not say 8 5
Years employed in Nouna district
<14 2
1-5 120 68
6-10 38 22
> 10 14 8
CSPS: Centre de Santé et Promotion Sociale.
CMA : Centre Médical avec Antenne Chirurgical.
AS : Attaché de Santé.
ICP : Infirmier Chef de Poste.
IDE : Infirmier Diplômé d’Etat.
IB : Infirmier Breveté.
SFE : Sage-Femme d’Etat.
ME : Magneticien d’Etat.
AA : Accoucheuse Auxiliaire.
AIS : Agent Itinérant de Santé.
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ment” (level 2 aOR 1.12, p=0.003; level 3 aOR 1.47,
p<0.001) and “reimbursement of medical fees” (level 2
aOR 1.19, p<0.001; level 3 aOR 1.49, p<0.001), an
increase in attribute levels increased the odds of choosing
a given alternative. For the RBF mechanism, both house-
hold coverage (aOR 0.97, p=0.311) and an annual prize to
the three facilities with the greatest increase in coverage
(aOR 0.86, p<0.001) decreased the odds of a given alter-
native being chosen (relative to the number of individuals
enrolled as RBF indicator to determine payment size). For
the RBF recipient, the odds of a payment mechanism
alternative being selected decreased significantly when the
local health facility management team was the recipient
(aOR 0.86, p=0.001), while a global payment to the entire
facility health worker team increased the odds of selection
of a payment alternative (aOR 1.09, p=0.03) (relative to
the CBI scheme pre-determining fund allocation among
health facility staff). The only attribute level without a sta-
tistically significant effect on the selection of a payment al-
ternative was household coverage as an indicator of
evaluation for the RBF mechanism.
The estimates using random- and fixed-effects logit
and random-effects probit models were not substantially
different from the results of the conditional logit model,
and provided poorer fits than\the conditional logit
model (Table 6).
For the model that estimated interaction terms between
sex and payment attributes (Model 2), the only interaction
term that had a significant effect on the selection of a
Table 5 Conditional logit model estimates
Payment attribute alternatives aOR s.e. % change aOR s.e. % change
* aOR s.e. % change
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Capitation plus subsidy 1.16*** (0.039) 16.0 1.05 (0.052) 5.0 1.15*** (0.044) 15.5
Capitation disbursed twice per year 1.18*** (0.046) 17.6 1.19** (0.069) 18.7 1.12** (0.046) 11.9
Capitation disbursed quarterly 1.08* (0.041) 7.9 1.05 (0.061) 4.8 1.09* (0.045) 9.5
Allocation of medical supplies 1.12** (0.041) 11.7 1.11 (0.068) 11.2 1.09* (0.045) 8.7
Allocation of medical supplies and equipment 1.47*** (0.054) 46.7 1.40*** (0.076) 40.2 1.44*** (0.058) 44.3
50% reimbursement of service fees 1.19*** (0.051) 19.0 1.27*** (0.081) 27.4 1.21*** (0.055) 21.4
100% reimbursement of service fees 1.49*** (0.075) 49.3 1.34*** (0.103) 34.5 1.41*** (0.077) 41.5
RBF
c indicator: households enrolled 0.97 (0.033) −3.4 0.93 (0.049) −7.3 0.97 (0.036) −3.3
RBF indicator: greatest change in coverage 0.86*** (0.029) −14.1 0.89* (0.043) −11.4 0.90** (0.032) −9.7
RBF recipient: global payment to health team 1.09* (0.043) 9.0 1.19*** (0.063) 19.1 1.12** (0.048) 12.4
RBF recipient: health facility management team 0.86*** (0.039) −13.8 0.84** (0.056) −16.5 0.85** (0.042) −14.8
Interaction terms Male Head nurse
Capitation plus subsidy - - - 1.18* (0.079) 18.4 1.02 (0.084) 2.2
Capitation disbursed twice per year - - - 0.98 (0.076) −1.9 1.37** (0.151) 37.5
Capitation disbursed quarterly - - - 1.06 (0.081) 5.5 0.92 (0.095) −7.6
Allocation of medical supplies - - - 1.01 (0.077) 1.2 1.18* (0.101) 18.4
Allocation of medical supplies and equipment - - - 1.09 (0.080) 8.6 1.10 (0.111) 10.2
50% reimbursement of service fees - - - 0.89 (0.076) −11.2 0.89 (0.120) −10.7
100% reimbursement of service fees - - - 1.20 (0.121) 20.1 1.41* (0.188) 40.9
RBF indicator: households enrolled - - - 1.07 (0.073) 7.0 1.02 (0.086) 1.7
RBF indicator: greatest change in coverage - - - 0.95 (0.064) −4.9 0.72*** (0.070) −27.7
RBF recipient: global payment to health team - - - 0.86 (0.067) −13.8 0.84 (0.091) −16.5
RBF recipient: health facility management team - - - 1.05 (0.095) 5.3 1.10 (0.130) 9.6
Number of respondents 176 176 176
Number of observations 7392 7392 7392
Log-likelihood −4373 −4360 −4350
Wald X
2 304.5 321.9 426.7
Pseudo R-squared 0.080 0.083 0.085
aOR: adjusted odds ratio.
s.e.: standard error.
RBF: results-based financing.
*percent change in odds for unit increase in X.
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increased capitation payment through child subsidies
(aOR 1.18, p=0.003). Being male had a positive effect on
choosing an increased premium level. The model that
tested interaction terms between professional qualifica-
tions and preferences for payment attributes (Model 3)
included several odds ratios that were statistically signifi-
cant. Being a facility head nurse had a positive effect on
choosing a payment schedule of twice per year (aOR 1.37,
p=0.004), donation of medical supplies by the CBI (aOR
1.18, p=0.047), and the full reimbursement of service fees
(aOR 1.40, p=0.01), but had a strong negative effect on
the odds of selecting a payment mechanism alternative
that included an annual prize for the greatest change in
CBI coverage as an RBF evaluation indicator (aOR 0.72,
p=0.01). In the final two models (Models 4 and 5), none
of the interaction terms significantly affected the odds of
an alternative being selected. Estimates for these models
are thus not presented in our results.
Discussion
Ensuring that health workers are motivated to work
towards the achievement of health system goals is a
key component to successful health-sector interven-
tions [40-42]. Previous studies have shown that health
workers’ dissatisfaction with payment mechanisms in
CBI can lead to low coverage, because health workers
can influence the uptake of insurance in the popula-
tion from which they draw their patients [13,26,43,44].
Our results provide new information about how health
workers in Burkina Faso value different provider pay-
ment mechanisms in the context of a CBI scheme,
where coverage has been low since the inception of
the scheme, and there is strong evidence that health
worker dissatisfaction with the scheme has contributed
to the low coverage.
DCEs are a comparatively inexpensive approach to ob-
tain data for health program planning and policy making
[45-47]. DCEs have been used to elicit patient [46-48]
and health worker [49-52] stated preferences in a variety
of settings. In our study, we use DCE for the first time
to elicit health worker preferences for provider payment
mechanisms. Discrete choice experiments, in conjunc-
tion with focus group discussions and in-depth inter-
views to determine payment attributes, have the
potential to be of great use in the process of choosing
provider payment mechanisms in developing countries,
potentially leading to better alignment between health
worker incentives and health systems goals [21]. In our
study, we find that reimbursement of service fees and
CBI contributions for medical supplies and equipment
were the attributes of the insurance payment mechan-
ism valued most by health workers. For a proposed RBF
mechanism linking health worker financial incentives to
insurance coverage, health workers significantly pre-
ferred to be paid a flat payment for each individual who
enrolled in their catchment area as opposed to a com-
petitive prize for the health centers that achieved the
largest coverage gains. Health workers were also
strongly opposed to payment of the RBF to the health-
facility account managed by the local health manage-
ment committee.
Capitation payment
Capitation payment may help to control costs by trans-
ferring health-expenditure risk to the health workers or
facilities [53]. In the case of the CBI scheme in Nouna,
health expenditure deficits incurred by contracted facil-
ities were reimbursed at the end of each year. As a re-
sult, health-expenditure risk was not transferred to
facilities, but facilities commonly suffered negative con-
sequences of temporary revenue shortfalls, as they
were not able to restock drugs or supplies until the
annual reimbursement was paid. In previous years, due
Table 6 Random- and fixed-effects models
Random-
effects
logit
Fixed-
effects
logit
Random-
effects
probit
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
aOR
a s.e. aOR
a s.e. aOR
a s.e.
Capitation plus subsidy 1.16*** (0.029)1.16***(0.029) 1.09*** (0.017)
Capitation disbursed
semesterly
1.18*** (0.044)1.18***(0.044) 1.10*** (0.025)
Capitation disbursed
quarterly
1.08* (0.038)1.08* (0.038) 1.05* (0.023)
Allocation of medical
supplies
1.11** (0.040)1.12** (0.040) 1.07** (0.024)
Allocation of medical
supplies and equipment
1.48*** (0.050)1.47***(0.050) 1.27*** (0.027)
50% reimbursement
of service fees
1.20*** (0.042)1.19***(0.042) 1.12*** (0.024)
100% reimbursement
of service fees
1.49*** (0.052)1.49***(0.052) 1.28*** (0.027)
RBF indicator:
households enrolled
0.96 (0.034)0.97 (0.035) 0.97 (0.022)
RBF indicator: greatest
change in enrollment
rate
0.86*** (0.031)0.86***(0.030) 0.91*** (0.020)
RBF recipient: global
payment to health team
1.10** (0.037)1.09* (0.037) 1.06** (0.022)
RBF recipient: health
facility management
team
0.85*** (0.032)0.86***(0.032) 0.91*** (0.021)
Questionnaire version 0.98* (0.008) 0.99* (0.005)
Number of observations 7,392 7,392 7,392
Number of respondents 176 176 176
Liklihood ratio X2 681.9 761.7 727.6
Log-likelihood −4738 −4373 −4738
aOR: adjusted odds ratio.
s.e.: standard error.
RBF: results-based financing.
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to restock drugs on credit from the District Health
Office, and were only able to pay off their loans after
reimbursement by the CBI [23,25]. It is likely that re-
placing the annual capitation payment with a bi-annual
one – as strongly preferred by the health workers in
our study – will reduce the probability of facility bank-
ruptcy and drug stock-outs. Surprisingly, controlling
for other payment attributes, respondents preferred
payments in two rather than in four installments. One
reason for this may be the fact that enrollment con-
tinues to be limited and premiums low; leading to
overall small capitation payments. If capitation pay-
ments were divided into four installments, they may
be considered too insignificant for planning purchases
or investments, and setting up dedicated savings
accounts for installments may carry substantial trans-
action costs.
Service fees
In a previous qualitative study on health worker percep-
tions of the CBI scheme, providers expressed concern
that increased CBI coverage would lead to higher health-
care utilization rates [23]. In the past, high healthcare
utilization rates among enrollees led to challenges in en-
suring uninterrupted basic medical supplies for consulta-
tions and services. As consultation and service fees are
neither directly paid by CBI enrollees nor reimbursed by
the insurance scheme, health workers feared that any in-
crease in CBI coverage of the population from which
their facilities drew their patients could decrease facility
revenue, leading to less disposable income to purchase
basic medical supplies [23]. Our DCE provides further
evidence for this fear: reimbursement of service fees and
an annual provision of medical supplies and materials by
the CBI scheme had the greatest effect on whether a
payment alternative was chosen or not, leading to the
recommendation to diversify provider payment in the
CBI to include these mechanisms.
Health worker characteristics and preferences
Our DCE analysis shows that sex does not play a par-
ticular role in health worker preferences for CBI pay-
ment attributes, except in the preference for an
increase in the capitation payment for children. Men
(n=103, 59%) significantly preferred an increase in the
capitation per child, while women (n=73, 41%) did
not. This difference may be due to certain respondents
misinterpreting the increase in capitation payments as
an increase in premium payments, borne by individual
enrollees, while in fact the increase in capitation pay-
ments would be a result of external subsidization for
children, and not a direct increase in premium levels
for enrollees. If this were the case, it might imply that
women were more likely to fear that such an increase
could in the long-term reduce children’s access to
health insurance and healthcare.
The CBI payment preferences for head nurses (n=32,
18%) were significantly different from other health work-
ers for several payment attributes. Head nurses signifi-
cantly preferred capitation payments made twice instead
of once per year, while other health workers did not share
this preference. Head nurses also preferred RBF pay-
ments to be paid directly to the health worker team in a
lump-sum payment, as opposed to a method of distribu-
tion predetermined by the CBI management committee
or being paid to the local management committee. Fur-
thermore, head nurses were particularly opposed to a
competition-based RBF evaluation mechanism. These
differences in payment preferences between head nurses
and other health workers may stem from head nurses’
particular awareness of factors affecting the financial sta-
tus of their facilities. Facility head nurses are also likely to
understand the functioning of the CBI payment mechan-
ism better than other health workers.
It is plausible that this increased knowledge, in par-
ticular the abovementioned concerns regarding the
current capitation payment schedule, may contribute to
the expressed preference for payments being made in
both April and July. Regarding the preference for RBF
payments being made directly to the health worker
team, head nurses may view the opposing alternatives as
leading to a reduction in their autonomy in deciding
how to utilize these new payments.
Neither the level of care of the facility where the re-
spondent worked nor employment in the current CBI
implementation zone (rather than outside the zone) sig-
nificantly affected the type of payment mechanism pre-
ferred by health workers in our study. Previous studies
have noted that health worker preferences and motiv-
ation are strongly affected by past experiences with insur-
ance and the level of care at the facility where a health
worker is employed [54]. It is likely that we did not find
such effects, because our variables on level of care and
CBI experience only capture the situation at the time of
the survey and not past work experiences, which for
many health workers in this community have included
levels of care other than the levels of their current facil-
ities and employment both with and without CBI
contracts.
Policy changes based on the DCE results
Upon completing the analysis of the DCE data in September
2010, the authors conducted a series of meetings with local
decision-makers involved with the CBI scheme in Nouna,
in order to disseminate results and discuss policy implica-
tions. Meetings were held with the CBI Management Team,
the CBI Community Representation Committee, the
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District Health Office, senior staff at the district hospital,
and the head nurses from the 13 primary-care facilities
contracted with the scheme. Presentations were made to
each stakeholder highlighting the key results of the DCE.
These presentations were followed by brainstorming and
discussion sessions on how to revise the payment mechan-
ism for the upcoming enrollment campaign in 2011. Based
on the discussions of the DCE findings in these meetings, a
new payment mechanism, which closely reflects the health-
worker preferences for payment mechanisms elicited in the
DCE, was adopted in October 2010 (see Table 7). As of
January 2011, health workers are paid in two installments
(April and July each year); capitation levels for children have
increased to 1,500 FCFA ($3 USD), with the additional
1,000 FCFA added as a subsidy by an external donor; and
consultation fees are fully reimbursed at the end of each
year. No provision of medical supplies is provided by the
scheme, as increased revenue generated from the reim-
bursement of consultation fees are now used to cover the
cost of supplies. Payments for the RBF are calculated based
on each individual who enrolls in the primary-care facility
catchment area during the annual enrollment period. Facil-
ities are now paid an additional 200 FCFA ($0.40 USD) per
new enrollee and 100 FCFA ($0.20 USD) per re-enrollee.
During the stakeholder discussions, several participants
s t r e s s e dt h ei m p o r t a n c eo fi n c l u d i n gt h el o c a lh e a l t hm a n -
agement committee in the payment process, and that the
health worker team should not be entitled to 100% of the
RBF payments. Thus the decision was made to earmark
25% of the RBF payments for facility improvement funds,
which would be managed by the local health management
committee.
While the new payment mechanisms were introduced
in January 2011, the CBI Management Unit decided to
introduce it in a staggered fashion, first in half (7) of the
primary-care facilities and only later in all of the 13
primary-care facilities and the district hospital. The ini-
tial assignment to the change in provider payment
mechanisms was randomized at the facility level. Prior to
introducing the new payment mechanisms, alongside the
discrete choice experiment, in-depth interviews and a
quantitative “satisfaction survey” were conducted to as-
sess workers’ satisfaction in relation to the applied
Table 7 Changes in CBI payment mechanisms based on the results of this study
Payment attribute Previous payment mechanism (2004–2010) New payment mechanism (2011)
Capitation payment level The enrollment premium was 500 FCFA
($1 USD) for children under 15 and 1500
FCFA ($3 USD) for adults 15 and older.
The enrollment premium is 500 FCFA ($1 USD) for
children under 15 and 1500 FCFA ($3 USD) for adults 15
and older. A 1000 FCFA subsidy for children is added for
each child enrolled, resulting a capitation level of 1500
FCFA for children and 1500 FCFA for adults.
Capitation payment schedule The capitation was paid once a year,
normally in July or August.
The capitation is paid twice per year, once in April
(after the first three months of the enrollment
period) and once in July (after the closing of
the enrollment period).
Allocation of medical supplies
and equipment
No medical supplies or medical equipment
were provided to the facilities that are
contracted with the CBI scheme.
No change from previous mechanism.
Reimbursement of consultation
and service fees
None. 100% of consultation fees of CBI enrollees are calculated
at the end of the calendar year and reimbursed
to health facilities during the first quarter of the
following calendar year.
Capitation deficit reimbursement If enrollees were prescribed
more drugs than the capitation covers,
the deficit was calculated at the end
of each calendar year and reimbursed
during the first quarter of the following
calendar year.
No change from previous mechanism.
Results-based financing (RBF)
provider payment mechanism
None. For each individual enrolled in a primary-care facility
(CSPS) catchment area, the primary-care facilities are paid
200 FCFA ($0.40 USD) per new enrollee and 100 FCFA
($0.20 USD) per re-enrollee. Payments are divided
between a direct global payment to the facility health
worker team (75%) and the health facility account (25%),
and will be paid in April and July. The secondary-care
facilities (CMA) do not receive any RBF payments.
FCFA: Franc Communauté Financière Africaine, the local currency used in Burkina Faso. 500 FCFA=$1 USD.
CBI: Community-based health insurance.
CSPS: Centre de Santé et Promotion Sociale.
CMA: Centre Médical avec Antenne Chirurgical.
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views were also conducted to measure client satisfaction
and health worker behavior during consultations, with
particular focus on whether health workers promoted
CBI during patient visits. The randomized assignment
will provide the opportunity to confirm the expectations
raised by this study and to measure the effect of the
changes on CBI coverage, provider satisfaction, and pa-
tient satisfaction in a randomized controlled experiment.
Study limitations
We note a few potential limitations of our study. Firstly,
some respondents may have misunderstood the payment
attribute level related to premium levels for children, be-
cause a large proportion of respondents chose an attri-
bute level that was intended to be inferior. Given that the
proposed increase in capitation payments for children
was to be subsidized by an external donor, the higher
payment level should have received 100% support. An-
other explanation for the large proportion of respondents
who chose the attribute level intended to be inferior is
that respondents were fearful that relying on such
subsidization could generate an unsustainable depend-
ency on external support. If the subsidy were to end after
a few years, enrollees themselves would potentially be-
come responsible for the higher payments.
Furthermore, as in any study conducted in a particular
community, our results may not be applicable outside
this particular setting, which has had a distinct history
with experiences with alternative health insurance struc-
tures that other communities in Burkina Faso are lacking.
Future studies need to examine whether health worker
preferences for provider payment mechanisms are similar
in other communities.
Conclusions
Health worker support is a key component to CBI sustain-
ability and success. It may be possible to increase this sup-
port by revising the CBI payment mechanism to align
health worker incentives with CBI objectives, such as pro-
viding quality care and expanding coverage, and by finan-
cially motivating health workers to increase efforts to
promote and support the scheme. Our study demonstrates
that it is feasible to elicit health worker preferences for pro-
vider payment mechanisms in a rural district in a sub-
Saharan African country. We find that reimbursement of
service fees and CBI contributions for medical supplies and
equipment were the attributes of the insurance payment
system valued most by health workers. Based on our results,
the provider payment mechanisms in the CBI scheme in
Nouna health district, Burkina Faso, were recently changed.
These changes are expected to increase health worker sup-
port for the CBI scheme and to lead to increased CBI cover-
age, improving the long-term performance of the scheme.
Ongoing studies will establish whether these expectations
will be met, and will thus provide an opportunity to validate
our findings in their use for health policy.
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